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Written evidence from Dr Anna Tilba (PCT0027)
1. Do higher-cost providers deliver higher performance, or simply eat into clients’ savings? 
There is no conclusive evidence about higher-cost providers delivering higher performance. 
Indeed, there is more empirical evidence to suggest that higher-cost (active) managers 
charge higher fees with no corresponding performance. In fact, persistent inefficiencies in 
pension fund governance and lack of trustee understanding of operating costs of pension 
funds are eroding future retirement incomes. This is coupled with asset managers’ 
unwillingness to disclose all the explicit and implicit costs attached to each investment. 
Pension fund investment costs differ significantly between actively managed and index-linked 
funds and their impact is often little understood by investors, who are not always aware that 
they are being overcharged. For example, Bogle (2014)1 uncovers some estimates of the 
additional costs that investors incur when they invest in actively managed funds – costs which 
are not incurred by index-linked funds. These additional costs include: transaction costs, cash 
drag, sales loads as well as excess taxes. Bogle (2014) suggests that the portfolio 
transactions costs alone for active fund managers have increased substantially as the fund 
portfolio turnover has leaped almost fivefold from 30% in 1960s to 140% today. This reflects a 
misalignment of incentives and of decision-making power, exacerbated by groupthink and 
bias. Investors are often a diffuse and uncoordinated group. Yet, it is near impossible for 
investors to figure out how much their investments are costing them because additional costs 
are hidden and too high (Haslem2, 2004; 2006; Ellis, 20123). Indeed, the all-in fund costs have 
rarely, if ever, been estimated because the data on such costs is almost impossible to 
quantify.
Notwithstanding progress made in calculating the all-in investment costs, Bogle (2014) 
demonstrates that, over the long-term, compared with costly actively managed funds, low-
cost index funds create extra wealth of 65% for retirement plan investors, providing a truly 
remarkable improvement in the standard of living to retirees.
Pitt-Watson et al4. (2014) provide a comprehensive overview of published literature on 
investment costs in Britain and around the world – finding that pension fund costs are obscure 
and inaccurate. One of the few indications of the loss of value in retirement income comes 
from the report of pensions charges in Ireland. This report collected information on the level of 
pension charges levied on pensions’ arrangements in order to assess whether charges are 
reasonable and transparent. Worryingly, the report identified significant differences between 
disclosed and all-charges for different retirement arrangements where all-charges on average 
are 3% higher than disclosed charges for every retirement arrangement (Department of 
Social Protection5, 2012).   
FCA’s Asset Management Market Study6 also highlighted the lack of value for money in many 
active managers as well as opacity of investment costs and charges, creating a special 
Institutional Disclosure Working Group (IDWG) and tasking it to develop reporting templates 
1 Bogle, John. 2014. ‘The Arithmetic of ‘All-In’ Investment Expenses.’ Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 70, no. 1: 
13-21.
2 Haslem, John A.A. 2004. ‘Are Mutual Fund Expenses too High? A Commentary’. Journal of Investing, 9Fall): 8-
12.
3 Ellis, Charels D. 2012. ‘Investment Management Fees Are (Much) Higher Than You Think.’ Financial Analysts 
Journal, vol. 68, no.3 (May-June):4-6.
4 Pitt-Watson, D., C. Sier, S. Moorjani and H. Mann (November 2014), ‘Investment costs: An unknown quantity. 
A literature review and state of play analysis’ 
http://www.fscp.org.uk/publications/pdf/investment_%20david_pitt_%20watson_et_al_final_paper.pdf.
5 Department of Social Protection, 2012. Report on Pension Charges in Ireland 2012.
6 FCA (2016) Asset Management Market Study [available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-
publishes-final-report-asset-management-sector ]
on costs and charges to help combat the above problems This is a significant step forward in 
terms of creating more transparency and accountability around investment costs and charges 
and ultimately improving consumer understanding of the value they get for the money they 
spend.  
2. Is the Government doing enough to ensure that workplace pension savers get value for 
money? 
Questions arise as to whether market forces are sufficient for protecting investors’ interests, 
because the monitoring of investment costs falls through the lines of responsibilities within 
pension fund boards. These problems are exacerbated by behavioral biases and herding 
within trustee boards, which is evident from Tilba, et al. (2016)7 study and the latest CMA 
investigation into the investment consultancy market8. The FCA is yet to publish the 
Institutional Disclosure Working Group’s templates on investment costs and charges. It will be 
up to the Regulator to enforce the uptake of these templates by pension fund clients and their 
investment fund managers as there is currently seems to be a malaise and passive resistance 
by the asset management industry to utilize these templates. 
In a separate stream, the investigation in the investment consultancy industry by the 
Competitions and Market Authority also produces useful remedies to improve value for money 
when it comes to investment management and investment advice. The Government should 
endorse CMA’s recommendation to extend the FCA’s regulatory perimeter to include the 
relevant services provided by investment consultancy and fiduciary management firms. The 
CMA’s proposals also included mandatory tendering when first moving to fiduciary 
management, and a requirement for firms to give customers clearer information, such as fees 
and investment performance. It also called for trustees to set their investment consultants 
strategic objectives and for firms to report against these. These remedies will go a long way in 
improving value for money for present and future pensioners. 
3. What is the relative importance of empowering consumers or regulating providers? 
It should be a balancing of both. The FCA needs to have more powers over the investment 
consultants and also have ‘more teeth’ when it comes to enforcing of the use of the 
standardized IDWG templates for costs and charges. Consumers also need to be more 
engaged in this process. My own experiences of consulting pension funds trustees suggests 
that there is a need to create more awareness around the issues of the costs and charges 
and behavioral biases when making investment decisions as well as what information would 
trustees need to ask of their IC and FM. The Pension Regulator should be looking at these 
issues alongside developing guidance to support pension trustees.
4. How can savers be encouraged to engage with their savings? 
FCA’s review of the asset management industry has revealed that one of the significant 
challenges relates to the lack of innovation and disruptive change in the financial sector. For 
example, there is a lack of product innovation when it comes to Pension Dashboards or 
Investment Platforms. An ‘Investment platform’ is a single technology enabled point of access 
to the entire investment market and they are increasingly used by consumers and financial 
advisers to access retail investment products and to manage investments. The platform 
market has steadily grown over the last 8 years, with Assets Under Administration for both 
adviser and direct platforms increasing from £108 billion in 2008 to £592 billion in 2016 (FCA, 
7 Tilba, A., Baddeley, M. and Yixi, L. (2016) Report for the Financial Conduct Authority. ‘The Effectiveness of 
Oversight Committees: Decision-Making, Governance, Costs and Charges. UK Financial Conduct Authority, 
Available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/tilba-baddeley-liao.pdf
8 CMA Investment consultants market investigation 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b4f4db2e5274a730e4e273b/investment_consultants_market
_investigation_provisional_decision_report.pdf 
2017). However, it is unclear whether these platforms actually help investors make good 
investment decisions and whether such investment solutions offer good value for money.
Furthermore, it appears that there are a lot more areas for concern in this market. Firstly, 
switching from one provider to another is difficult and there are unclear accountability 
relationships with investment advisors. The fact that there are only a few ‘big players’ on the 
market suggests that the competition may not work effectively. In some cases, using 
platforms may actually add extra charges as opposed to reducing costs. As noted in the FCA 
Asset Management Study, platform advisors may not interested in passing the benefits of 
economies of scale to the consumer. For example, platform discounts may be available only 
to new consumers and the level of discounts is very low, with average discount of only 0.05%. 
Therefore, ‘the value for money’ is more assumed than demonstrated. Questions also arise 
about the actual economies of scale for these platforms as some fund groups refuse to play 
impact of vertical integration. There are three key questions that we need to be asking about 
investment platforms: 
- How can platforms make investment fund managers compete harder? 
This is a simple ‘chicken or the egg’ dilemma – as a fund manager, you cannot get 
platform clients unless your fund is on a platform but you can’t get on a platform without 
client demand. There also seems to be a form of ‘social inequality’ amongst fund 
managers coupled with increased regulation, platforms can become barriers to market 
entry, making rich even richer. 
- How can platforms reduce complexity? 
There are 5,500 investable stocks globally but there are 76,000 investment funds 
available globally and out of those only 20% earn their fees.
- How can platforms help drive better value for money? 
With a 1% fee the investment pot is 1/3 lower. Value for Money should equal to 
Outperformance before fees and expenses divided by fees and expenses.
There is also another very important thing missing in most policy and financial services discussions, 
namely, what I do not hear in many other discussions in the City, is the voice of the ‘next generation’, 
as the interests and the ways of thinking and doing of the young ‘millennial’ generation is extremely 
underrepresented. How can we begin to create better ways of achieving better value for consumer’s 
money if we do not attempt to engage and understand financial innovators and the entrepreneurs of 
tomorrow? What will be the nature of work, the way the young generation thinks of spending and 
saving money? The trend towards ‘portfolio careers’ where young people more from project to project 
or small independent technology-driven start-ups suggests that traditional approaches to saving for 
retirement may be obsolete in 20-30 years’ time. Furthermore, proliferation of market comparison 
websites such as www.gocompare.com or www.moneysupermarket.com  are good indicators of future 
investment trends. If we are so used to using mobile banking and market comparison sites, why aren’t 
we using these revolutionary ideas in relation to asset management and savings? Similar questions 
have been asked in relation to pensions by Henry Tapper, founder of the PensionPlayPen and 
Director of First Actuarial in his blog (https://henrytapper.com/2017/12/12/the-pension-dashboard-is-
changing-but-for-the-better/).
In short, UK financial services industry needs to challenge itself and its thinking much harder in 
creating disruptive positive change in the face of new technologies and innovation. The focus should 
be on the future, not the past. The debates in the City should no longer be about fixing yesterday’s 
problems, but trying to anticipate the needs of the future generation.
5. How important is investment transparency to savers? 
As an Ambassador for the Transparency Taskforce (TTF) (founded by Chris Sier and Andy 
Agathangelou) I believe in the TTF idea that ‘Higher levels of transparency are a pre-requisite 
for fairer, safer, more stable and more efficient markets that will deliver better value for money 
and better outcomes. Furthermore, because of the correlation between transparency, 
truthfulness and trustworthiness, we expect our work will help to repair the reputational 
damage the sector has been suffering for decades’. As the sunlight is said to be the best 
disinfectant and the electric light the most efficient policeman, transparency in financial 
services is mostly a preventative measure and a surrogate for trust which has been lost. It is 
not going to fix all the problems, but it will certainly make it easier for consumers to compare 
and help make an informed decision about the true value of investments. 
6. If customers are unhappy with their providers’ costs and investment performance/strategy, 
are there barriers to them going elsewhere? 
CMA’s review of the investment consultancy market found few barriers when it comes to 
changing the investment advisor, but it is harder and more expensive to switch between 
fiduciary management service providers. Broadly, both FCA and the CMA Reports indicate 
that there are low levels of switching, particularly when it comes to investment consultants.  
My research into pension fund trustee investment decision-making9 suggests that lack of 
switching is more a behavioral problem as people tend to just ‘carry on’ with their providers.   
7. Are Independent Governance Committees effective in driving value for money? 
I would assume that having Independent Governance Committees is better than not having 
them at all.  
8. Do pension customers get value for money from financial advisers? 
The UK’s investment consultants and fiduciary managers advise on, or manage, at least £1.6 
trillion worth of pension scheme assets. Their influence means that it is vital both sectors work 
for the benefit of the end investor and ensure optimal value for money for British pension 
schemes.
Levels of transparency regarding investment consultant performance are extremely low. 
CMA’s investigation into the investment consultancy market reveals that investment 
consultants fail to add value in their product recommendations, i.e. investment consultants are 
failing to recommend products that outperform net of fees. Specifically, they found No clear 
statistically significant evidence that collectively ICs ‘buy rated’ products outperform 
benchmarks net of fees. This evidence is supported by the latest academic research into 
investment consultants performance by Tim Jenkinson (and colleagues) finds no evidence 
that recommended by investment consultants products perform better. Authors find no 
evidence that investment consultants have manager selection skills10. 
Similarly, my own research11 into pension fund governance and trustee investment decision 
making highlights the lack of consultants’ value for money and a lack of trustee engagement 
9 Tilba, A., Baddeley, M. & Yixi, L. (2016). FCA Asset Management Market Study: Research Report on the 
Effectiveness of Oversight Committees: Decision-Making, Governance, Costs and Charges. London, Financial 
Conduct Authority.  https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/tilba-baddeley-liao.pdf 
10 See Tim Jenkinson’s work, in particular: 
Picking winners? Investment consultants’ recommendations of fund managers. Journal of Finance, 2016 (with 
Howard Jones and Jose Martinez)
Investment consultants’ claims about their own performance: What
lies beneath? Working paper, July 2017, ssrn.com/abstract=3214693 
(with Gordon Cookson, Howard Jones and Jose Martinez)
11 Tilba, Anna & Wilson, John F. (2017). Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives: Examples of 
Pension Fund Engagement and Disengagement. British Journal of Management 28(3): 502-518. 
http://dro.dur.ac.uk/25868/ 
Tilba, A., Baddeley, M. & Yixi, L. (2016). FCA Asset Management Market Study: Research Report on the 
Effectiveness of Oversight Committees: Decision-Making, Governance, Costs and Charges. London, Financial 
Conduct Authority.  https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/tilba-baddeley-liao.pdf 
Law Commission’s Consultation Paper No 215: Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/cp215_fiduciary_duties.pdf  Pages 7, 17, 38, 40, 41, 44, 53, 
144, 193, 194 
and challenging of the investment consultants, which leads to the loss of value of the pension 
savings for consumers. The lack of engagement is particularly worrying as the CMA Report’s 
evidence indicates that ‘less engaged schemes in investment consultancy pay higher prices 
than more engaged schemes’. Furthermore, in the context of the move away from the Defied 
Benefit to the Defined Contribution arrangements, the lack of trustee engagement within the 
DC arrangement is particularly worrying.
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